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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-6035

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

February 5, 2016

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The Honorable Tom Price, M.D.
Chairman, Committee on the Budget
U.S. House of Representatives
207 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to section 301(d) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and clause 4(f) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives for the 114th Congress, we are forwarding to you the views of the Committee on Armed Services regarding the national defense Budget Function (050) for fiscal year 2017 (FY17).

As you have stated, "We must lead; we must define the agenda." As members of the Committee on Armed Services, we wholly concur. Speaker Ryan outlined an agenda for rebuilding a confident America that is respected and leads in the world. Witness after witness before this committee has testified that the threats to this country are greater than at any time since World War II, and that the pace of technological change greatly increases the risks our country faces. The criticality of this moment in history compels us to conclude, as Speaker Ryan has, that the United States must reclaim its role as a global leader, and that the United States military, as one element of national power, must reform to be both strong and agile.

There is a common misperception that it is the President's job to decide what we need to defend the country and then simply send the bill to Congress – expecting us to follow along. In fact, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution explicitly states that it is Congress's duty to "raise and support," "provide and maintain," and "make rules for the government and regulation of" the military forces of the United States. Our primary duty as legislators is to provide for a common defense. It is our first and greatest responsibility.

Therefore, although the President has not yet submitted his budget request for FY17, we welcome the opportunity to provide our views on the resources required for national defense and the committee's legislative activities, which have been specifically designed to ensure we have an effective military capability for the 21st century.

In sum, we believe that an adequate national defense requires significantly more funding, as we will explain below. We also recognize that the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 set a level of base funding for FY17, as well as a minimum estimate of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to meet additional base requirements and to fund current operations. At an absolute minimum, we must enforce the agreement that Congress and the President reached and fully fund those levels.

Context of Committee Recommendations

The context of our analysis below is based upon the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015. The minimum FY17 funding levels for national defense included in the BBA, which provided for defense and non-defense funding levels in FY17, is less than what our national defense requires, based on the current threat environment, the readiness of our forces, and our global commitments. However, after years of budget unpredictability, which further exacerbated the degrading readiness of our forces, many Members of the committee made a judgment call and voted for the BBA, despite the shortfall, because of the considerable value in short-term budget stability.

As we move forward, it is our expectation that the bare minimum funding levels committed to in the BBA will be honored. While the budget request has not yet been received, our committee is concerned that the Administration has inaccurately interpreted the budget agreement for OCO as a ceiling, not a floor. Our goal is to ensure any budget resolution fully funds those minimum levels, irrespective of the plans the Administration may have.


The Current Budget Agreement

The BBA provided for a base funding level in FY17 of \$551 billion for defense. In addition, the agreement provided for a minimum of \$59 billion in adjustments to the defense cap for OCO, for a total of \$610 billion for national defense. Since it was understood during the budget negotiations that \$551 billion for base funding was insufficient to meet the military's base requirements, the agreement further designated funding within OCO to cover base budget requirements. The level of funding for base requirements was specific for FY16, but undefined in FY17. However, last year's budget request and House Budget Resolution both identified the level of funding necessary to support FY17 base requirements as approximately \$574 billion. Therefore, the consensus was that the FY17 base requirements would be supported through a combination of base funding and OCO funding.

To cover that minimum level of funding, \$23 billion of the OCO adjustment would support base requirements, and an additional amount of OCO would fund current operations, the precise amount of which would depend on the world security situation and U.S. deployments. Any additional unidentified emergent requirements, which are appropriately funded through OCO, should be added to the President's budget submission. As indicated in the section by

section analysis of the legislation, the section referring to OCO funds “establishes *minimum* adjustments to the defense...caps for overseas contingency operations.”¹

Unfortunately, while the budget request has not yet been received, our committee is concerned about how the Administration may be re-interpreting the budget agreement. We anticipate the Office of Management and Budget may determine that the combined total of \$610 billion for base and OCO in the BBA is an upper limit for defense spending. Therefore, it is our understanding that the total request for funds will equal an estimated \$610 billion for all national defense requirements, and that new additional OCO requirements will cannibalize funding for base requirements. For example, the Comptroller of the Department of Defense (DOD) has publicly stated that in light of emerging OCO requirements there will be “a \$15 billion or so cut” in FY17 that will result in “slow-downs in some modernization programs.”² This is a direct contradiction to the agreement between the House of Representatives and Senate that the OCO levels for defense in FY17 were the floor – not the ceiling. The chart below depicts this concern.



Should the President’s budget request break faith with the BBA, we recommend House Republicans insist upon at least an additional \$15 - \$23 billion, depending on how much of the designated funding in OCO for base requirements is consumed to address valid emergent threats, to cover the national defense base requirements in the upcoming budget resolution and to enforce the executive branch’s agreement in the BBA. We also recommend a further discussion of additional resources for emergent issues we see looming based on the President’s underestimation of security risks to the United States and mismanagement of core national

¹ <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/RU/RU00/CPRT-114-RU00-D001.pdf>, pg. 2.

² <http://news.usni.org/2015/11/30/pentagon-comptroller-mccord-new-2-year-budget-deal-helps-now-without-hurting-in-2020s>

security priorities, including our posture in Afghanistan; our escalating efforts to counter ISIS; and our efforts to deter Russian aggression.

Assessing National Defense Requirements

Reclaiming our role as a global leader does not mean the United States must “police” the world; rather, the United States must engage when hostile actors threaten our interests and must reassure allies in order to preserve the international order that the United States has painstakingly established. If not, as we have seen in places such as Syria, Ukraine, and the South China Sea, others will fill the vacuum and establish an order that is inconsistent with our values and our security.

To identify sufficient levels of funding for our Nation’s defense, our committee continues to review the requirements of the military to successfully execute the National Defense Strategy. We have spoken at length with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both formally and informally, to determine if the current strategy can achieve proper security for this nation. We have noted their unanimous, professional opinion that the risk of the strategy is high and that any further reduction in resources will exacerbate the risk. As General Martin Dempsey, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told our members last year, the fiscal year 2016 budget request represented “the lower ragged edge” of the resources required to execute the strategy - even at a higher risk.

Nevertheless, to remain impartial and to solicit input beyond the uniformed military, the committee proposed the establishment of the bipartisan National Defense Panel (NDP) to conduct an independent assessment of the Department of Defense’s strategic planning. The NDP was specifically charged with conducting an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks described in the Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, as well as assessing a variety of possible force structures and resource requirements to meet the Department’s strategy.³

The Panel unanimously determined that the size of the military is “inadequate given the future strategic and operational environment,”⁴ recommended that the Budget Control Act caps be abandoned for national defense, and cautioned that the funding baseline for national defense should be returned as soon as possible to the funding baseline in the fiscal year 2012 defense budget request (which requested \$650 billion for national defense for FY17). The Panel’s rationale was that the fiscal year 2012 budget “represents the last time the Department was permitted to engage in the standard process of analyzing threats, estimating needs, and proposing

³ The National Defense Panel consisted of the following members: Dr. William Perry, General John P. Abizaid (Ret.), General James Cartwright (Ret.), Ambassador Eric Edelman, Former Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy, Lieutenant General Frank Kearney (Ret.), Lieutenant General Michael Maples (Ret.), Former Congressman Jim Marshall, General Gregory Martin (Ret.), and Former Senator James Talent.

⁴ The National Defense Panel, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future,” July 2014, pg. 3.

a resource baseline that would permit it to carry out the national military strategy.”⁵ The full text of the Panel’s report can be found [here](#).⁶

The Panel also concluded, as has our committee, that the assumptions about the security environment used by the Department to justify a smaller force and lower defense budget have not materialized. The Department assumed that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were ending; that we were “build[ing] a closer relationship” with Russia, and Europe would be “producers of security rather than consumers of it”; that U.S. forces would no longer be sized “to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations”; that we could “increase reliance on our allies and partners” to compensate for “reductions in our capacity”; and that force regeneration, innovation and technology could all compensate for a smaller force.

More recently the committee reviewed a joint report developed by members of the American Enterprise Institute and Foreign Policy Institute, “*State of the US Military: A Defense Primer*.” This report, released in October 2015, discusses the degradation of the readiness, capacity, and capabilities of our national defense. The report supports the recommendations of the National Defense Panel, including that a return to funding levels in prior years is proper to maintain sufficient military strength. The full text of the report can be found [here](#).⁷

Based on our analysis of the threat environment, the readiness of our forces, and our global commitments, we concur with the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs, the National Defense Panel, and these outside groups.

Declining Defense Funding

Yet contrary to the extensive assessments of funding requirements, the trend line of defense funding is going in the wrong direction, which is having a direct impact on our country’s ability to address threats to our security, interests, and values, and to deter aggression from adversaries and rising regional powers.

In 2010, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, famously observed, “The most significant threat to our national security is our debt.” While the first part of his quotation has been used to justify declining defense funding, the rest is often forgotten. He went on to say, “And the reason ... is because the ability for our country to resource our military ... is going to be directly proportional ...[to] our economy. That's why it's so important that the economy move in the right direction, because the strength and the support and the resources that our military uses are directly related to the health of our economy over time.” Our committee Members agree that the debt is a threat to our security. But we see it through the lens that Admiral Mullen saw it – that the reason debt threatens our national security is that debt makes it more difficult to fund adequately the strong and agile military that is necessary for our nation’s defense.


⁵ The National Defense Panel, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future,” July 2014, pg. 5.

⁶ http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Ensuring-a-Strong-U.S.-Defense-for-the-Future-NDP-Review-of-the-QDR_0.pdf

⁷ <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/State-of-the-US-Military.pdf>

Clearly, Admiral Mullen was not suggesting that we should fix the national debt on the backs of the men and women who volunteer to serve our nation in the military. Under sequestration, national defense spending decreased 19 percent in FY17, when compared with the level projected for FY17 in the outyear budget documentation submitted in February 2010 under President Obama's first budget request. The chart below depicts the incremental reduction in funding for national defense since that time and the corresponding changes to our National Defense Strategy.

Timeline of the FY17 Funding Level National Defense (050) Base Funding



Any sober assessment of the last seven years would conclude that cutting resources for national defense has neither controlled the debt nor made us safer. The following chart displays the recent outlays for mandatory and defense discretionary spending, as well as the actual and estimated net interest payments required since fiscal year 2000. Sequestration level funding for national defense will not significantly change the rate of growth in mandatory spending, while net interest outlays continue to grow. In fact, our spending to service the debt is projected to be at the same levels as defense discretionary spending by fiscal year 2020.




Table 8.1, Historical Tables, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2016, February 2015

As members of the Armed Services Committee, we support bold policies to invigorate our economy and adequate funding for our national defense. These are not mutually exclusive, but, as Admiral Mullen noted, inextricably linked.

Committee Legislative Activities

The primary legislative vehicle of the Committee on Armed Services is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The NDAA contains all the essential authorities required to sustain our military and is the chief mechanism through which Congress exercises its Article I, Section 8 responsibilities. The importance of this legislation has ensured that for 54 consecutive years this bill has been signed into law. We intend to do the same again this year, and, working with our partners in the Senate, our goal is to file and pass a conference report before the end of the current fiscal year. As we develop our next NDAA in 2016, the committee plans to conduct a significant number of hearings and round table discussions to better understand the current security environment, evaluate proposals for reform, and receive independent feedback on the National Defense Strategy and the military requirements necessary to support a robust strategy at low-to-moderate risk.

Although we review the budget request annually, the Administration's proposals do not form the core of NDAA. In fact, we frequently disagree with the Administration's requests. Many of these committee initiatives – such as refueling an aircraft carrier in order to keep it in service, keeping the A-10 to meet commanders' operational demands in the Middle East, and keeping both the U-2 and Global Hawk when we have severe ISR shortages – have proven prescient. Today, we have to make those judgment calls within limited budgets and in the most complex, difficult national security environment our nation has ever faced. We have to make

deliberate decisions to ensure that we can still field this unique force for good in the world. That means deciding the level and composition of funding needed to defend the country, ensuring the armed services recruit and support the best people, deciding what capabilities are needed, overseeing the activities of the Executive Branch, and cutting red tape so the military can adapt quickly.

A 21st century American military requires strength and agility. Strength is crucial. Seventy years ago, Churchill observed, "From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that...there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness. . . . We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength." Many would argue that such temptations are being offered around the world today.

In his State of the Union address three weeks ago, President Obama chided those who question our military strength, proclaiming, "We spend more on our military than the next eight nations combined." This is a red herring. No other nation has the global commitments that we do – a mantle of responsibility which the United States has consciously shouldered to preserve our own national interest and economy. And we should be unapologetic of the investment required to field the finest, best equipped, best trained fighting force in the world. We do not believe in sending our sons and daughters into a fair fight.

What's more, our adversaries measure our strength based on our national will and military capability. Currently, both our adversaries and our allies question the will of the United States and its Commander in Chief. This is a refrain we hear repeatedly from foreign officials and see played out weekly as adversaries continually test the limits of international norms without consequence. As for capability, military strength requires enough capability to deal with a wide array of threats – both quality and quantity. While it is true, for example, that a ship today is more capable than one twenty years ago, that ship can only be at one place at a time. We still need enough of them to meet the threats all around the world, as well as our obligations. And we do not have enough. A case in point is that today we cannot maintain a continuous aircraft carrier presence in either the Pacific or the Middle East, leaving the United States with less ability to assert its presence in the South and East China Seas and less fire power in its campaign against the Islamic State. These gaps are projected to continue periodically.

For we know that, to ensure our warfighters enter the fight with unmatched capabilities, we must stem the erosion of our technology superiority and shorten the time to acquire new weapon systems. The committee will be closely examining the Department's Third Offset efforts; cyber authorities, organization, and doctrine; the modernization of our aging nuclear deterrent; and the application of special operations forces.

Of course, it is also crucial to ensure we apply the investment in our military judiciously. Waste and inefficiency drain military strength and erode political support, so our committee will continue to conduct vigorous oversight and make reforms where needed.

Reform also enables agility which is the second necessary characteristic of a 21st century American military. We must have the military capability able to protect us from unknown and unexpected threats. We have to be able to learn, to anticipate, and to adapt faster than anyone else. In other words, the only way our security can be maintained is with a military that is agile. And reforms to promote agility are a central focus of our committee. We will group our reforms into three categories: people, acquisition, and organizational.

The most important component of our defense is our people. Last year, we followed many of the recommendations of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, including instituting a new retirement system. These were sweeping changes that put these programs on fiscally responsible paths. Moreover, the committee was able to make these reforms by building support among active duty service members, family members, and current retirees.

This year we are examining military health care. Year after year the Administration has proposed raising Tricare fees and copays for service members and retirees. Simply taking more money out of service member's pockets, without improving the care provided, is not reform. The committee will examine the whole military health care system, taking into consideration the recommendations of the Commission, but also ensuring the military health system can sustain trained and ready healthcare providers to support the readiness of the force and a quality healthcare benefit that is valued by its beneficiaries.

We cannot afford to assume that we will always be able to recruit and retain the top quality people we have serving today. And there is much more for us to examine beyond retirement and health care. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, passed in 1980, for example, is overdue for a look. And we should never be complacent, especially in today's world, about training and education – two different things.

As to acquisition reform, the committee will file a stand-alone bill in March with the intent to incorporate these reforms into the FY17 NDAA. This will build upon the good start the committee made last year, focusing on the acquisition workforce, acquisition strategies for each program, and rebalancing the responsibilities between the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In the committee report (H. R. 1735) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, the committee expressed concern that the Department of Defense's conventional acquisition process is not sufficiently agile to support warfighter demands. On average, major defense acquisition programs operate for 9 years before yielding new capabilities. Requirements determination, budgeting, and contracting can each take another 2 years or more before program initiation. Meanwhile, technological change has been rapidly generating new innovation. Global threats are evolving even more quickly, with adversaries leveraging new technologies to exploit gaps in our military capabilities. The committee's ongoing acquisition reform efforts seek oversight and process changes so that defense acquisition programs can better pace technological changes and emerging threats. The committee seeks to create more

opportunities to rapidly deploy new capabilities, while improving the tools the Department has to develop and acquire advanced technologies.

Therefore, our new legislation will enable more experimentation and prototyping to encourage innovation, ensure technology is mature before large scale production begins, reduce the odds that large sums will be invested in a program that gets canceled, and, coupled with open architectures, allow us to upgrade weapon systems at a lower cost. We understand that legislation alone will not create the cultural shift that is required to embrace the idea that enlightened trial and error is the key to success. Today, it is hard to get money for experimentation without being attached to a program of record – and programs of record tend to be defended at all costs, even when it does not make sense. This culture shift is needed not only in DOD, but in Congress as well. We have to accept – or even expect – regular, small failures, for if every experiment is a success, we are not learning very much.

Finally, we must continue to pursue organizational reforms. We recognize that the Department's organizational structure and allocation of responsibilities, established in the 1980s, may not be the optimal construct for meeting today's challenges or providing the agility needed for the future. Building on our efforts last year to streamline DOD management headquarters and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, the committee will take a close look at functions that no longer need to be performed in a surgical attempt to delay and simplify. We have to ensure that our organizational structure inside the Pentagon fits in today's world. While most everyone agrees that the Goldwater-Nichols reforms 30 years ago were successful, it is also time to take a fresh look at them and not be afraid to make improvements.

A responsive, healthy organization must also be able to do self-assessment. For more than 20 years, the Comptroller General of the United States has consistently identified the financial management of the Department of Defense as a high-risk area. The Department's inability to track and account for billions of dollars in funding and tangible assets continues to undermine its management approach. It also creates a lack of transparency that significantly limits congressional oversight. The Department's inability to produce auditable financial statements undermines its efforts to reform defense acquisition and to realize efficiencies. Without these objective tools, neither the Department nor Congress can verify that greater value is being created. As a result, it was this committee that mandated the Department implement the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) plan in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-84). We will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of its progress as it moves to accomplish auditable financial statements by September 30, 2017.

Summary

As you requested, this letter primarily outlines the committee's legislative priorities and the level of resources required to implement those priorities for FY17, in a manner consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. However, we would be remiss if we did not conclude by noting that the temporary suspension of sequestration-level funding for FY17 should not divert our attention away from future funding levels. While a mechanism is in place to sustain the "lower ragged edge" of national security this fiscal year, the BBA merely deferred the tough

The Honorable Tom Price, M.D.

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financial decisions to the next fiscal year. Sequestration will be at the forefront shortly after Inauguration Day in January 2017. We should ensure the next Administration, Republican or Democrat, is not handcuffed by artificial fiscal constraints placed upon it by the Budget Control Act for national defense.

We understand the challenges of the current fiscal environment. For FY17, we should ensure that the agreement reached last fall is enforced and that adequate funding levels are approved to support the minimum base requirements this year. We should also recognize that the BBA was passed before the Paris attacks by ISIL. Operational needs have only increased. The choices we must make to secure a 21st century American military are difficult, but with sequestration upon us again next year and with the wide ranging threats we face, the choices will not get easier. Our nation's security will depend on how we lead and how we define our agenda.

In closing, we appreciate the opportunity to express these views on behalf of the Committee on Armed Services. We look forward to working with you and the members of the Committee on the Budget to construct a budget plan that reflects our commitment to meet emerging threats and secure our national defense.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Mac Thornberry', with a stylized flourish at the end.

William M. "Mac" Thornberry
Chairman


cc: The Honorable Chris Van Hollen, Ranking Member, Committee on the Budget


Member of Congress



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

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

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